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The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) was established in 1996 
after immense political pressure from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
Administrations and wide bipartisan support to serve as a forum to 
prosecute the most complex and difficult national security immigration 
removal cases while protecting vital classified information from public 
disclosure. Yet, after twenty-three years, this Article III court has not 
heard a single case. 
 
This Article provides a fresh and critical inquiry into this veritable 
zombie court that has fallen from the public consciousness, yet still 
exists with a standing cadre of designated judges. It fills a significant 
gap in the conjunction of national security and immigration literature 
as the most comprehensive scholarly inquiry that has been done on the 
ATRC. Our novel conclusions include the reasons why the court has not 
ever heard a case and an analysis into its continued legitimacy despite 
subsequent War on Terror-era enactments that streamline the removal 
of most classes of noncitizen national security threats. We uniquely 
establish that the ATRC was dead on arrival due to its unworkable, yet 
legislatively remediable, procedural flaws. We examine the dynamic 
history of this forgotten court, analyze its structure, and propose 
commonsense legislative revision that would render this important 
national security law enforcement tool viable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After twenty-three years and despite an always-ready cadre of five federal 
judges, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) has not heard a single case.1 
The ATRC is an Article III body2—distinct from the administrative 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Not only has the ATRC never heard a case, it has also never received or considered 
an ex parte, sealed application from the Department of Justice to initiate proceedings. Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court, 1996–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-1996-present [https://perma.cc/GG4U-XZHT] (“As 
of 2018, the removal court had never received an application from the Attorney General for 
the removal of an alien terrorist, and had therefore conducted no proceedings.”). 
 2 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–59 
(1982) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ. joined; Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment, with whom O’Connor, J., joined) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 1) (describing the necessary attributes for the exercise of the judicial power of the United 
States). Though some describe the ATRC as an “Article I court” based on the fact that it was 
created by Congress, e.g., Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process 
Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2178 (2006), “given that the court is 
staffed entirely by Article III judges serving in [an] adjudicative role, it appears likely that 
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court would be considered an Article III court.” ANDREW 
NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43746, CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 8 n.64 (2014) (citing United 
States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987)). In a similar fashion to its creation of 
the ATRC, Congress “relied on its Article III power to ‘ordain and establish’ the lower 
federal courts when it created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR)[,]” and “[e]ven though these 
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immigration courts—that exists to adjudicate civilly prosecuted alien3 
deportation hearings within which the government can use classified evidence 
against alleged terrorists without exposing national security information to the 
defendant or to the public.4 Established by the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996,5 and with a design that was heavily influenced by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to the degree that it was intended to 
be populated by the same judges,6 the court’s statutory predicate was 
championed at the request of President Clinton by then-Senators Joe Biden and 
Bob Dole.7  
This Article uniquely establishes that the ATRC was dead on arrival due to 
its unworkable—yet legislatively remediable—procedural flaws. We will 
examine the dynamic history of this forgotten court, analyze its structure, justify 
the continuing need for it in light of substantial intervening legislation, and 
lastly, propose a commonsense legislative revision that would render this 
important national security law enforcement tool viable. 
In particular, there is still a continuing need for an ATRC to remove certain 
terrorist lawful permanent residents (LPRs). Though intervening statutes, such 
as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)8 
and the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act),9 have provided alternative means 
to criminally prosecute and/or remove noncitizens who otherwise would be 
theoretical candidates for the ATRC, there is no other law enforcement recourse 
for certain terrorist LPRs than this specialized national security court.10 There 
is no recourse to remove LPRs against whom the sole evidence of their terrorist 
                                                                                                                     
[the FISC and FISCR] courts sit only to hear a hyper-specialized set of cases, there is no 
question that they are Article III courts, since they are staffed by Article III judges and 
exercise ‘the judicial power of the United States.’” STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW 647 (6th ed. 2016) (citing In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 
F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007) (“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, 
the FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III[.]” (footnote 
omitted))). 
 3 The Court recently utilized the term “noncitizen” in the place of “alien” to “refer to 
any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 
S. Ct. 2105, 2109–10 n.1 (2018). This Article utilizes the term “alien” only when its use is 
inextricably intertwined with the nuances of the statutory scheme that it examines. 
 4 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2012). 
 5 Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or “Summary” Justice?: The Alien Terrorist 
Removal Provisions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143, 144–45 (1996). 
 6 Id. at 146 (“The removal court is modeled after the seven-member secret court set up 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).”). 
 7 See 141 CONG. REC. S2502–03 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 8 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546. 
 9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 
Stat. 272. 
 10 See infra Part III. 
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identity is FISA-obtained or derived from foreign intelligence information or 
that is not appropriate for declassification or public acknowledgment.11 
The ATRC statutes, however, are flawed in two dispositive ways. First, the 
conjunctive findings necessary for the United States to proceed with an ATRC 
removal proceeding where the court does not approve of the government’s 
proposed unclassified summary of key evidence should be styled in a disjunctive 
formulation. Under the current scheme, the ATRC must find both that:  
(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause 
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily 
injury to any person, and (II) the provision of the summary would likely cause 
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily 
injury to any person.12  
The conjunctive provisions situate the government in the same type of 
“Catch-22” dilemma that justified the ATRC’s creation—the untenable choice 
between disclosing and risking sources and methods underlying national 
security information versus the removal of alien terrorists. As evidenced by 
decades of non-use, the burden placed on the government by this conjunctive 
provision is too high and renders the ATRC unviable.13  
Second, the language that describes the threat posed by the disclosure of the 
needed classified evidence establishes a problematically unclear level of 
classification. The ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable harm 
to the national security.”14 That standard appears to exist somewhere between 
the standards for classifying evidence as “Secret”—“serious damage” to the 
national security—and “Top Secret”—“exceptionally grave damage” to the 
national security. In light of these settled standards for classifying evidence that 
have existed for more than forty years,15 Congress should incorporate this 
normative formulation of classification to provide clarity to both the Department 
of Justice and the ATRC regarding what type of classified evidence it 
contemplates being sufficient for proceeding without a summary.16 
Additionally, while making the foregoing critical revisions, Congress 
should make other minor changes related to the use of classified evidence in 
ATRC decision-making to clarify its original intent.17 For example, the ATRC 
statutes should be revised to clarify that classified evidence submitted to the 
court for in camera and ex parte review may be part of the basis for the court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 11 See infra Part III. 
 12 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) (2012). 
 13 See infra Part IV.A. 
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).  
 15 See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (June 28, 1978) 
(enumerating the types of information that can be classified and the classification levels); 
see also Exec. Order No. 8381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147, 1147 (Mar. 22, 1940) (establishing certain 
military information as “‘secret, ‘confidential,’ or ‘restricted’”). 
 16 See infra Part IV.B. 
 17 See infra Part IV.C. 
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decision, which—despite being the undisputed animating purpose of the 
ATRC—presently is only implied.18 
This proposal is a precise and narrow solution that would render the ATRC 
a viable forum for the nation’s most difficult national security immigration 
removal cases, maintaining an irreducible minimum of due process afforded by 
providing initial and direct Article III judicial involvement and oversight. These 
solutions, along with the underlying statutes, are designed to be constitutionally 
compatible, but also minimalist to achieve the court’s operability in a non-
politicized way. The ATRC was never intended to be a high-volume court used 
for run-of-the-mill removal cases.19 It was intended to be a viable option for 
removing noncitizens who posed the greatest threat to the national security 
without having to compromise national security information and sources to do 
so.20 
II. HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK OF THE ATRC 
A. The Legislative Story of the ATRC 
The ATRC was created to address a “recurring problem experienced by the 
Department of Justice”—the inability to use classified information obtained in 
the course of antiterrorism investigations in removal proceedings without 
putting at risk the sources and methods responsible for such information.21 In 
the late 1980s, the Department of Justice famously sought to deport a group of 
noncitizens in Los Angeles “for their activity on behalf of the Popular Front for 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5).  
 19 See infra Part III. 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 17 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 22, 2002, at 1, 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf  [https://perma.cc/Z5HN-YYDJ]. 
Indeed, the House Conference Report that accompanied the law that ultimately created the 
ATRC noted, “The removal of alien terrorists from the United States, and the prevention of 
alien terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the most intractable 
problems of immigration enforcement.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 115 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
The House Conference Report further stated that: 
The stakes in such cases are compelling: protecting the very lives and safety of U.S. 
residents, and preserving the national security. Yet, alien terrorists, while deportable 
under section 241(a)(4)(D) of the INA, are able to exploit many of the substantive and 
procedural provisions available to all deportable aliens in order to delay their removal 
from the U.S. . . . In several noteworthy cases, the Department of Justice has consumed 
years of time and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars seeking to secure 
the removal of such aliens from the U.S. . . . The need for special procedures to 
adjudicate deportation charges against alien terrorists is manifest. 
Id. at 115–16. 
144 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).”22 That group came to be known as the 
“L.A. Eight.”23 In January 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) arrested them for immigration violations and attempted to detain them 
pending removal proceedings.24 The INS asserted that it had classified evidence 
that justified the detention, but an administrative immigration judge refused to 
consider such evidence and ordered their release.25 
In 1988, the Reagan Administration first proposed the creation of a court 
comprised of federal judges that would allow the government to balance the 
competing priorities of removal, where the defendant could defend against the 
charges and the government could protect classified information.26  
Congress did not act on President Reagan’s proposal,27 with the Democrat-
controlled Senate “refus[ing] to hold hearings on the proposal.”28 Nor did 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It and Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused 
Counterterrorism Laws and Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 677, 680–81 (2012) (quoting Benjamin Wittes, Secret Deportation Panel 
Raises Due Process Issues; Critics Blast New Court Set Up by Anti-Terrorism Law, 
RECORDER (Cal.), Apr. 25, 1996, at 1). 
 23 See Jeanne A. Butterfield, Do Immigrants Have First Amendment Rights? Revisiting 
the Los Angeles Eight Case, 212 MIDDLE EAST REP. 4, 4–5 (1999). The L.A. Eight were 
actually comprised of seven Palestinians and one Kenyan spouse. Id.; Neil MacFarquhar, 
U.S., Stymied 21 Years, Drops Bid to Deport 2 Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/us/01settle.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PF9J-
DFCY]. 
 24 See Butterfield, supra note 23, at 4.  
 25 See id. After decades of litigation, including in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
appears that ultimately none of the L.A. Eight were ordered removed, and some have become 
U.S. citizens. MacFarquhar, supra note 23; Judge Throws Out Charges in “Los Angeles 
Eight” Case, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-
releases/judge-throws-out-charges-los-angeles-eight-case [https://perma.cc/63UH-9F 
UU]. In December 2006, Aiad Barakat was naturalized in Los Angeles. See id. Three other 
members have been granted lawful permanent residency. Id. In October 2007, an 
immigration judge terminated deportation proceedings against two others, Khader Hamide 
and Michel Shehadeh, both of whom were lawful permanent residents when arrested and 
charged. Id. At least one scholar has suggested that “if the ATRC statutory framework was 
available in 1987, the DOJ would have successfully deported the L.A. Eight without 
revealing to them classified information.” Jonathan H. Yu, Combating Terrorism with the 
Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 5 NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 1, 4 (2015). 
 26 Valentine, supra note 21, at 1–2. The Reagan Administration’s proposal was labeled 
the “Terrorist Alien Removal Act.” Blum, supra note 22, at 681; Clarence E. Zachery, Jr., 
The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or Becoming the 
Enemy from Within?, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 291, 292 (1995); see also 134 CONG. REC. H3125 
(daily ed. May 10, 1988) (noting receipt of “[a] letter from the Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled, ‘Terrorist Alien Removal Act 
of 1988’; to the Committee on the Judiciary”); 134 CONG. REC. S7882 (daily ed. June 15, 
1988) (noting receipt of “[a] communication from the Acting Secretary Attorney General, 
Department of Justice, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled the Terrorist Alien 
Removal Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary”). 
 27 Valentine, supra note 21, at 2; Yu, supra note 25, at 2–3. 
 28 Blum, supra note 22, at 681; see also Zachery, supra note 26, at 292. 
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Congress act on the George H.W. Bush Administration’s renewed push for the 
creation of such a specialized court.29 Although the Department of Justice had 
considered the creation of such a court to be “one of its top counterterrorism 
legislative priorities in the mid-1990s”30 and Congress had been pushed by 
multiple presidential administrations, “Congress failed to pass any of the bills 
providing for these special procedures to remove alien terrorists” across three 
presidential terms, from 1989 through 1994.31 
In February 1995, then-Senator Joe Biden introduced on behalf of President 
Bill Clinton a bill that, inter alia, sought the creation of the ATRC.32 The bill 
sought to advance many of the terrorism-related provisions that both Presidents 
Reagan and Bush had pushed for without success.33 Two months later, on April 
19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bombed the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds of 
others.34 The Oklahoma City bombing captured the country’s attention and 
crystallized the resolve of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to address 
terrorism.35  
One week after the Oklahoma City bombing, Senate Majority Leader Bob 
Dole introduced the then-labeled “Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Valentine, supra note 21, at 2. 
 30 THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 97 (Aug. 2004). 
 31 Zachery, supra note 26, at 292 (citing 139 CONG. REC. 15,249-01 (1993) (statement 
of Sen. Smith); 140 CONG. REC. 14,534-02 (1994) (statement of Sen. Smith)). 
 32 S. 390, 104th Cong. at 1–2 (1995); see 141 CONG. REC. S2502–03 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting “I have introduced this bill at the President’s 
request,” but expressing concerns about the ATRC provisions as written); 141 CONG. REC. 
S2398–99 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (letter from President Clinton to Congress on the Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act of 1995) (“[One] of the most significant provisions of the bill 
will . . . [p]rovide a workable mechanism, utilizing U.S. District Court Judges appointed by 
the Chief Justice, to deport expeditiously alien terrorists without risking the disclosure of 
national security information or techniques.”); Zachery, supra note 26, at 292. 
 33 See Zachery, supra note 26, at 292. 
 34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Statement on the Execution 
of Timothy McVeigh (May 11, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2001/ 
May/218ag.htm [https://perma.cc/7L77-XQKW]. 
 35 See Carol W. Lewis, The Terror that Failed: Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the 
Bombing in Oklahoma City, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 201, 202 (2000). It bears noting that the 
February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which killed six and injured more than 1000 
individuals and which involved foreign nationals committing acts of terrorism on U.S. soil, 
see First Strike: Global Terror in America, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Feb. 26, 2008), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608 [https:// 
perma.cc/ZM3E-CR99], also played a significant role in the legislative story of the ATRC, 
see William C. Nagel, The Law Enforcement Approach to Combating Terrorism: An 
Analysis of US Policy 38 (June 2002) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438507 [https://perma.cc/YH2Y-XBSN]; Yu, supra note 
25, at 3–4. It did not, however, crystallize sufficient political will to enact anti-terrorism 
legislation. Zachery, supra note 26, at 292. 
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1995.”36 That bill contained language related to the creation of a removal court 
for alien terrorists, but with less comprehensive provisions than the version 
introduced earlier at President Clinton’s behest.37 
The following week, five Democrat Senators (Joe Biden, Thomas Daschle, 
Dianne Feinstein, Christopher Dodd, and Herb Kohl) introduced a revamped 
version of President Clinton’s proposed legislation as Senate Bill 761, adding 
additional provisions seeking “to provide . . . Federal law enforcement the 
necessary tools and fullest possible basis allowed under the Constitution of the 
United States to address . . . acts of international terrorism occurring within the 
United States.”38 Notably, S.761 included more robust language related to the 
ATRC, including provisions that were not in the Dole bill regarding the 
possibility that the ATRC might deem inadequate the government’s proposed 
unclassified summary of evidence showing the alien had engaged in terrorist 
activity, and the circumstances in which removal proceedings nonetheless 
would be permitted to press forward without the provision of an adequate 
summary.39  
Thereafter an agreement was reached, in which more robust provisions 
related to the ATRC—including provisions concerning proceeding without a 
summary—were included in the Dole bill,40 which was eventually renamed the 
                                                                                                                     
 36 Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 
CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“America will not be 
intimidated by the madmen who masterminded last week’s vicious and cowardly bomb 
attack in Oklahoma City.”). 
 37 Senator Biden referred to the Dole-introduced bill as “[t]he Republican substitute 
bill,” noting that it was “built largely around [the] proposals” in the bill he had introduced 
earlier in the year on behalf of President Clinton. See 141 CONG. REC. S7484 (daily ed. May 
25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a 
Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 247, 248 (1996) (discussing “the President’s very broad bill (Clinton bill) and majority 
leader Dole’s slightly narrower bill (Dole bill)”). 
 38 Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S. 761, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 CONG. 
REC. S6202 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (“Coupled with the 
President’s earlier antiterrorism bill directed at international terrorism, this is a sound step to 
respond to a national threat without throwing overboard the civil rights of law-abiding 
citizens.”). 
 39 Compare Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S. 761, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(Democrat Bill), with Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (Republican Bill). 
 40 S. Amend. 1199 to S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S7553–70 (daily ed. 
May 25, 1995) (filed on behalf of Senators Dole, Hatch, Nickles, Inhofe, Gramm, and 
Brown); see S. 735, 104th Cong. (June 7, 1995) (as engrossed in the Senate), https:// 
www.congress.gov/104/bills/s735/BILLS-104s735es.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKP-9U5S]. 
“Although Senate Democrats and Senate Republicans introduced competing bills to establish 
the ATRC’s procedures, they agreed on the court’s basic purpose.” John Dorsett Niles, Note, 
Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833, 
1834 n.2 (2008) (citing 141 CONG. REC. 4225 (1995) (statement of William J. Clinton, 
President of the United States)); see also Kopel & Olson, supra note 37, at 248 (“[A] deal 
was arranged by which various provisions from the Clinton bill would be added to the Dole 
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“Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (AEDPA).41 An 
amendment sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter was then adopted, which added 
language requiring dismissal of the action if the ATRC deemed inadequate the 
government’s initial proposed unclassified summary.42  
Almost a year to the day after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate began 
debating AEDPA.43 Congress passed AEDPA with broad, bipartisan support,44 
and on April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed AEDPA into law, formally 
creating what would become known as the ATRC.45 In his signing statement, 
President Clinton lauded the creation of the ATRC as one of the “tough new 
tools to stop terrorists before they strike.”46  
The ATRC statutes were revised later in 1996 as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), and, 
among other changes, Congress restored the possibility that removal 
proceedings might proceed even if the ATRC deemed the proposed unclassified 
summary inadequate, so long as certain criteria related to national security are 
met.47  
                                                                                                                     
bill, in exchange for White House support for the Dole bill’s provisions to sharply curtail 
habeas corpus.”); cf. 147 CONG. REC. S11,581 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (“The Alien Terrorist Removal Court was created . . . largely through the efforts of 
Senators Hatch and Dole.”). 
 41 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–32, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
 42 Other amendments would have included language that required the dismissal of any 
action where an unclassified summary was deemed inadequate. See, e.g., S. Amend. 1250 to 
S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposed by Senators Specter, Biden, Kennedy, and Simon). 
 43 See 142 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) 
(“This is a particularly relevant time to begin this debate because we are fast approaching 
the 1-year anniversary of the heinous crime that claimed the lives of so many men, women, 
and children in Oklahoma City, OK. Indeed, this Friday, the 19th, marks the 1-year 
anniversary of that tragedy.”). 
 44 AEDPA passed on a vote of 91–8 in the Senate and 293–133 in the House of 
Representatives. S. 735 (104th): Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s735/details [https://perma.cc 
/SF7A-6AAU]. 
 45 The court is not referred to as the ATRC in the original legislation, but formally 
adopted the name in its rules. ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL CT. R. 1, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37. 
 46 Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-
1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg630.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSW8-WEQ7]. 
 47 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009–641–44 (1996). The September 1996 amendment also added the provisions in 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1534(e)(3)(E) and (F) related to continuing the hearing without a summary and appointing 
a “special” cleared counsel for LPR defendants. Id. § 3009–642(a)(2). The amendment also 
added provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(E) labeled “continuation of hearing without 
summary,” which related to appeals in cases where no summary was provided. See id. 
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B. Processes and Standards for Using Classified Evidence  
Congress established a detailed process for ATRC removal proceedings.48 
Removal proceedings under the ATRC may only be pursued when the U.S. 
Department of Justice files a statutorily obligated application, including a 
certification by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, establishing, 
among other things, probable cause to believe that the proposed defendant is an 
alien terrorist for whom traditional removal proceedings would pose a risk to 
the national security of the United States.49 Proceedings are not initiated unless 
an ATRC judge agrees that the application establishes probable cause on both 
points.50 These preliminary steps are done ex parte, in camera, and under seal,51 
and none of the evidence submitted can be considered by the ATRC in 
determining whether to issue a removal order unless it is resubmitted in the 
government’s case in chief.52 
In order to use classified evidence in the removal proceeding itself, the 
government also must submit for the court’s review a proposed unclassified 
summary that could be given to the alien defendant.53 The court, in possession 
of both the classified evidence and the proposed unclassified summary, must 
determine whether the summary is “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a 
defense.”54 If the court finds the summary adequate, the case proceeds with the 
classified evidence included as part of the government’s case in chief, but 
without such information being disclosed to the alien defendant other than in 
the unclassified summary.55 
If the court finds the proposed summary inadequate, however, “the removal 
hearing shall be terminated” unless the judge finds both that “the continued 
presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
person,” and “the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any 
                                                                                                                     
 48 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1533–37 (2012). 
 49 Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
 50 Id. § 1533(c)(2). The government may supplement its application with “information, 
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a 
hearing on the application. Id. § 1533(c)(1). 
 51 Id. § 1533(a)(2). 
 52 Id. § 1534(c)(5). 
 53 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(A), (B). 
 54 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(C) (2012). 
 55 Id. § 1534(f), (i), (j). If the alien defendant holds permanent resident status, the ATRC 
will appoint cleared counsel who can “review[] in camera the classified information on 
behalf of the alien” and “challeng[e] through an in camera proceeding the veracity of the 
evidence contained in the classified information.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(i). Cleared counsel 
may not, however, “disclose the [classified] information to the alien or to any other attorney 
representing the alien.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii)(I).  
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person.”56 Where the judge finds that both criteria are met, the removal hearing 
proceeds, the alien is advised that “no summary is possible,” and the classified 
information is entered as evidence for the court’s consideration.57 
The removal hearing itself is open to the public and must occur “as 
expeditiously as practicable.”58 The alien defendant has the rights to be 
represented by counsel at government expense,59 and to present evidence,60 
subpoena witnesses,61 and cross-examine the government’s witnesses (except 
on issues related to classified information).62 The alien may not, however, seek 
to suppress evidence on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained.63  
Following the hearing, the ATRC must issue a written ruling,64 which either 
party may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.65 Notably, if an alien was not provided with an unclassified summary 
of the classified evidence by the government, appeal is automatic66 and findings 
of fact are reviewed de novo.67 All appeals are to be handled on an expedited 
basis, with the court of appeals required to issue a decision within sixty days of 
the ATRC’s decision.68 
Notwithstanding this detailed process, the ATRC has not been used in any 
way since its creation in 1996.69 Although the court has remained continuously 
constituted by five federal judges who are selected by the Chief Justice of the 
                                                                                                                     
 56 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii), (iii). The government is also provided one opportunity to 
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by the 
court.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(i). 
 57 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E). 
 58 Id. § 1534(a). 
 59 Id. § 1534(c)(1). 
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(2) (2012). 
 61 Id. § 1534(d). 
 62 Id. § 1534(c)(3), (d)(1), (d)(5), (e)(2). 
 63 Id. § 1534(e)(1)(B). 
 64 Id. § 1534(j). The court must redact any portion of its written decision “that would 
reveal the substance or source” of classified information that was submitted in camera and 
ex parte. Id. 
 65 Id. § 1535(c). 
 66 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(2) (2012). 
 67 Id. § 1535(c)(4)(D). 
 68 Id. § 1535(c)(4)(A), (B). 
 69 See supra note 1. 
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United States,70 the Department of Justice has yet to submit an application for 
the initiation of proceedings.71 
III. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ATRC 
In light of the ATRC’s complete non-use since its genesis and the 
subsequent enactment of legislation implicating its potential pool of cases, the 
threshold question of whether such a court is needed must be addressed.72 
Indeed, subsequent legislative changes to other sections of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) have materially changed the landscape upon which the 
ATRC was originally designed. Even taking these factors into account, 
however, we believe there is still a need for the ATRC as a venue for the most 
difficult removal cases. 
                                                                                                                     
 70 See 8 U.S.C. § 1532. The current members of the court are federal district court 
judges Anne Conway (M.D. Fla.), James Parker Jones (W.D. Va.), Michael Mosman (D. 
Or.), Thomas Russell (W.D. Ky.), and James Emanuel Boasberg (D.D.C.), who serves as the 
court’s chief judge. See Alien Terrorist Removal Court: Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-judges [https://perma.cc 
/X7Q5-3ETJ]. All five judges currently serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 
Compare id., with FED. JUD. CTR., FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT/FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW: CURRENT AND PAST MEMBERS (May 
2018), https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20FISCR%20Judges%20 
May%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6U8-XRFB]. Congress expressly suggested that this 
overlap might be a smart decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (“The Chief Justice may, in the 
Chief Justice’s discretion, designate the same judges under this section as are designated 
pursuant to section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
1803(a)).”). 
 71 See supra note 1. 
 72 Notably, the ATRC is not the only zombie federal court to have existed. For example, 
in 1971, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (based on the prior 
Emergency Court of Appeals), which had “exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the 
decisions of the U.S. district courts in cases arising under the wage and price control program 
of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.” Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1971–
1992, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/temporary-emergency-court-
appeals-1971-1992 [https://perma.cc/363Z-YX4J]. That court was abolished in 1992. Id. 
And in 1973, Congress created the Special Railroad Court, “which facilitated the 
consolidation and management of several railroads undergoing bankruptcy reorganization.” 
Special Railroad Court, 1974–1997, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
courts/special-railroad-court-1974-1997 [https://perma.cc/FA9T-ETVN]. The Special 
Railroad Court was abolished in 1997. Id. The authors are unaware, however, of any other 
Article III court that, like the ATRC, has never heard a case and has not been abolished. It 
bears noting, however, that the FISA Review Court heard its first case more than twenty 
years after its creation. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(noting that this case was the first appeal to the Court of Review since the passage of FISA 
in 1978). Theoretically, it is possible that the ATRC is simply a once-every-twenty-five-
years court and its time for use has not yet come. 
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The ATRC was intended to be a low-volume court.73 Congress created 
numerous threshold barriers for potential cases before they would reach the 
ATRC. For example, an application seeking to initiate ATRC proceedings must 
certify that “removal under [conventional administrative removal proceedings 
before an immigration judge] would pose a risk to the national security of the 
United States.”74 Thus, cases should strictly go through conventional removal 
proceedings if possible without risking the exposure of national security 
information.75 Congress specified that the ATRC is only to be used where the 
Attorney General determines that resorting to conventional removal 
proceedings would jeopardize national security.76 Moreover, given the 
Department of Justice’s law enforcement mission77 and the significant burden 
the ATRC statutes place on the most senior Department leadership before 
initiation of an action,78 there is strong incentive for the government to pursue 
criminal charges whenever possible.79 
Significant legislative reforms have undeniably narrowed the scope of 
potential cases necessitating utilization of the ATRC. In September 1996, five 
months after creating the ATRC, Congress enacted IIRIRA.80 IIRIRA modified 
the process for removal proceedings to require that a respondent placed in 
conventional administrative removal proceedings has the initial burden to prove 
lawful admission by an immigration officer, or if he cannot prove prior 
admission to the United States, to prove that he is admissible to the United 
States.81 Only if the individual proves lawful admission does the burden shift to 
the government to prove removability from the United States.82 Notably, the 
government may introduce and rely on classified information that the 
                                                                                                                     
 73 See, e.g., Andrew Becker, Terrorist Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, CAL. 
WATCH (Apr. 12, 2012), https://archive.ph/v0ga3 [https://perma.cc/JYJ8-DHRC] (citing 
DOJ officials as indicating “the court was intended to be low volume, as most suspected 
foreign terrorists can be removed without the use of classified evidence”). 
 74 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Our Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about [https:// 
perma.cc/S8W5-222P]. 
 78 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(B) (requiring “certification by the Attorney General or the 
Deputy Attorney General”). 
 79 Notably, however, conviction and removal are not mutually exclusive; an alien 
convicted of a terrorism offense who serves out his or her criminal sentence is likely 
removable, see id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), 1227(a)(4)(B) (terrorist 
activity), and 1101(a)(43) (listing aggravated felonies), and presumably, removal 
proceedings will be initiated against such individuals in most if not all cases. See, e.g., 
Meskini v. Att’y Gen., No. 4:14-cv-42, 2018 WL 1321576, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018) 
(discussing post-incarceration efforts to remove individuals convicted of terrorism-related 
offenses). 
 80 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546. 
 81 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). 
 82 Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
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immigration court reviews ex parte and in camera in circumstances where the 
noncitizen argues that he is admissible at the time of the commencement of the 
conventional removal proceedings rather than some previous admission.83 Thus, 
IIRIRA erected a key threshold barrier for potential ATRC cases by making it 
easier to use conventional removal proceedings in situations where the 
respondent was never inspected.84 Importantly, however, the IIRIRA 
amendments did not provide the ability to rely ex parte on classified evidence 
to establish removability of a subclass of noncitizens, lawful permanent 
residents (LPR).85  
In 2001, the PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of “engag[ing] in 
terrorist activity” under the INA.86 The PATRIOT Act amendments further 
impacted the pool of potential ATRC cases by modifying the lack-of-knowledge 
defense to ensure that individuals who provided material support to a terrorist 
organization, regardless of their claimed subjective belief concerning the 
intended purpose for such support, could be found to have engaged in terrorist 
activity and be removable.87 Thus, a wider range of conduct, some of which 
might be provable without needing to rely on classified evidence, would support 
conventional removal proceedings on terrorism-related grounds. 
The IIRIRA and PATRIOT Act provided additional law enforcement tools 
that reduced the pool of potential cases in which the ATRC might be needed.88 
Notwithstanding, we believe there is continuing need for the ATRC in relation 
to a specific type of case: LPRs for whom the only viable removal charge is 
based on terrorism activity that can only be proven by reliance on national 
                                                                                                                     
 83 Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (“[T]hese rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such 
national security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien’s 
admission to the United States or to an application by the alien for discretionary relief under 
this chapter.”). Notably, the government may rely on classified evidence in all conventional 
removal proceedings to oppose an alien’s request for forms of discretionary relief from 
removal. Id. 
 84 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 98 (“A major reason for the lack of use of the 
ATRC was that new immigration laws permitted the use of classified evidence in traditional 
deportation hearings, making recourse to a special court unnecessary.”). 
 85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
 86 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000), with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) 
(2001). 
 87 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012).  
 88 See, e.g., ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 98. We note that it is theoretically 
possible that the PATRIOT Act’s expanded definition language might qualify more cases 
for ATRC consideration. 
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security information that cannot be declassified.89 Indeed, removal of terrorist 
LPRs was likely the “main impetus of the ATRC.”90  
LPR defendants—which, at this point, are likely to be the only defendants 
due to the availability of other criminal and civil enforcement tools—are entitled 
to additional procedural protections that are not available to other noncitizens if 
there is no unclassified summary provided.91 These include a court-appointed, 
government-funded, cleared counsel who is entitled to review the underlying 
classified information and challenge it on the merits.92 This is similar to the 
procedural rights afforded by the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 
context,93 and like the classified information accessed under a CIPA protective 
order, such attorney is prohibited from disclosing any of the classified 
information to the defendant.94 
Moreover, LPR terrorists present a real threat, according to data on terrorist 
attacks by foreign-born individuals.95 A 2019 Cato Institute report found that 
foreign-born terrorists were responsible for at least eighty-six percent (or 3037) 
of the 3518 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end 
of 2017.96 The report also found that there were “192 foreign-born terrorists 
who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 1975 through 
2017.”97 The most common category of immigration status for the foreign-born 
terrorists was LPR; indeed “[m]ore terrorists have taken advantage of the LPR 
                                                                                                                     
 89 See, e.g., Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling Classified Evidence and a Petitioner’s Right 
to a “Meaningful Review” at Guantánamo Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2669, 2708 (2009) (noting that, theoretically, “the ATRC could be used to remove residents 
currently within the country and also permanent residents entering at a border where the 
government has secret evidence against them”). 
 90 Blum, supra note 22, at 685 (“[T]he main impetus of the ATRC appears to be 
deporting LPRs who are engaging in terrorist activity.”); id. at 691 (“Congress presumably 
created the ATRC to deal with LPRs charged under terrorist grounds of deportability.”). 
 91 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F). 
 92 Id. § 1534(c)(1), (e)(3)(F). One scholar has argued that this provision renders the 
classified evidence “non-secret.” See Niles, supra note 40, at 1860 (arguing that where 
cleared counsel is provided and allowed to review the classified evidence, e.g., where the 
case involves an LPR, “the evidence is not secret . . . [a]lthough the resident alien does not 
view the secret evidence personally, for the purposes of cross-examining the evidence the 
alien may fairly be said to view it constructively through the eyes of the special attorney”). 
 93 Lorr, supra note 89, at 2710 (“As in CIPA, the attorney cannot disclose the classified 
information to the alien.”). 
 94 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (ATRC non-disclosure provision), with 18 
U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (CIPA non-disclosure provision). 
 95 See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status & Nationality: A Risk 
Analysis, 1975–2017, CATO INST. (May 7, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/terrorists-immigration-status-nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017 [https://perma 
.cc/9UNQ-VDGB]. 
 96 See id. An additional “68 were murdered by unidentified terrorists.” Id.  
 97 Id. Notably, the report “counts terrorists who were discovered trying to enter the 
United States on a forged passport or visa as illegal immigrants.” Id. By contrast, there were 
“788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 
1975 through 2017.” Id. That said, there is no method for removing a natural-born terrorist. 
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category than of any other visa category.”98 Thus, contrary to what might be 
expected, “most foreign-born terrorists often live [in the United States] 
peacefully for years before concocting their schemes.”99 It is important to have 
a tool to remove such individuals where the government discovers and classified 
evidence shows that they are engaging in terrorist activity, including planning 
an attack. 
The ATRC is also necessary to utilize specific types of evidence without 
compromising the underlying sources. Most notably, the ATRC statutes waive 
the requirement of notice to a defendant where the government intends to use 
evidence that is obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).100 This varies from the general 
rule requiring such notice, which otherwise applies in every “trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, or other authority of the United States.”101 Similarly, using the ATRC 
may be necessary for cases involving evidence that was collected by a foreign 
government, particularly by human intelligence sources, and shared with the 
United States.102 Thus, using such evidence in a criminal case or as part of the 
case in chief in conventional removal proceedings for an LPR would require 
disclosing its existence, which “can pose an obstacle to future cooperation 
between the United States and the foreign government.”103 Evidence obtained 
via the intelligence of a foreign government is often provided to the United 
States with the caveat that it and the cooperation that furnished it remain 
secret.104 And where the evidence comes from a witness who is a foreign 
intelligence agent or human source, the foreign government may simply refuse 
to allow the witness to testify.105 Foreign governments do not always follow the 
same protocols as United States law enforcement when collecting evidence.106 
                                                                                                                     
 98 Id. The Cato report notes, however, that the odds of an individual being killed on 
U.S. soil by a foreign-born terrorist are highest for individuals present in the United States 
on a tourist visa, because eighteen of nineteen of the 9/11 hijackers were in that status. Id. 
Moreover, “[t]errorists with green cards came from 30 different countries.” Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1) (2012); see also Harkenrider, supra note 5, at 150 (“[T]he 
suspected alien terrorist is not entitled to any information gathered under FISA . . . .”). 
Indeed, the defendant is even prohibited from learning of the source for such information via 
other discovery. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(C).  
 101 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2012). 
 102 Yu, supra note 25, at 14–15 (noting that “government or foreign personnel—that are 
clearly not law enforcement—largely gather the evidence in terrorism cases”). 
 103 AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC. ET AL., TRYING 
TERRORISTS IN ARTICLE III COURTS: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED 15–16  
(July 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/try 
ing_terrorists_artIII_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf  [https://perma.cc/D499-J7GS]. 
 104 Id. at 16.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 24. 
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Importantly, regardless of how the United States obtained the evidence, the 
ATRC will not entertain motions by the defendant to suppress the evidence.107  
Finally, maintaining the ATRC is generally a cost-neutral proposition.108 
The five judges who serve on the ATRC do so as a collateral responsibility and 
do not receive additional compensation.109 The ATRC has no budget or staff, 
and “exists without a website or even a physical meeting place.”110 The court’s 
procedures were enacted decades ago and remain in place, waiting for the 
moment when the court is called into action.111 To the extent there is any cost, 
it is substantially outweighed by the “human cost of LPR terrorism” which one 
estimate totals as $255 million over a forty-three-year period ending in 2017.112 
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
A commonly advanced hypothesis to explain the ATRC’s non-utilization is 
the lack of certainty regarding the constitutionality of the court’s adjudicatory 
procedures under the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee.113 While 
                                                                                                                     
 107 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B). This elimination of the evidentiary exclusionary rule also 
covers challenges to chain of custody where essential links in the chain are classified. Yu, 
supra note 25, at 16. Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay rules, 
do not apply. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(h).  
 108 Robert Sorrell, Federal Judge in Abingdon One of 12 to Serve on Never-Used Court 
to Remove Terrorists, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.herald 
courier.com/news/federal-judge-in-abingdon-one-of-to-serve-on-never/article_05590 
83f-ac0d-563f-aefb-595a5804134c.html [https://perma.cc/7HUQ-R3VA] (citing a 
spokesperson for the Administration Office of the U.S. Courts). But see Emily C. Kendall, 
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court and Other National Security Measures You May Have 
Never Heard Of: The Need for Comprehensive National Security Reform, 18 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 253, 269–70 (2011) (arguing, without support, that “disbanding the 
ATRC . . . will also save money” because it is an “inst `itution that wastes money, 
manpower, and resources that could be put to much better use in other facets of homeland 
security”). 
 109 Sorrell, supra note 108 (citing a spokesperson for the Administration Office of the 
U.S. Courts); Becker, supra note 73. 
 110 Our View: Special Court Has Never Seen a Case. It Never Should, BRISTOL HERALD 
COURIER (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.heraldcourier.com/opinion/our-view-special-court-
has-never-seen-a-cas-it/article_505a451b-d425-5489-bac2-f7652fe2dfe.html [https://perma 
.cc/QV4G-PHSG]; Becker, supra note 73. 
 111 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37. 
 112 See Nowrasteh, supra note 95.  
 113 See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 856 (4th ed. 2007) (“It 
may be that constitutional doubts about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special 
court are why the government has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 22, at 703 (“Many 
scholars have argued that the ATRC deprives aliens of procedural due process under the 
Fifth Amendment; hence, its non-use may reflect a fear that if it was used to remove aliens 
based on classified evidence, it may be struck down as unconstitutional.”); id. at 704–10 
(reviewing arguments made against constitutionality of ATRC); Niles, supra note 40, at 
1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has never 
used the court.”).  
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debate on that topic is to be expected because the statutory scheme has never 
been judicially tested, we view such explanation as incomplete because it does 
not meaningfully consider or examine the nuance we explore in this Article.114 
The United States has proven itself willing to test the due process muster of its 
various national security or immigration enforcement tools.115 Presumably, a 
number of circumstances have arisen since the AEDPA’s passage that would 
justify risking constitutional challenges to the statute or to the court by using it. 
The 9/11 Commission staff report indicates that at least 100 cases had been 
referred to and reviewed by the Department of Justice for possible ATRC 
proceedings.116 The report acknowledges that many of the potential cases were 
“overwhelmed” by “the procedural complexities,” or “stalled by internal Justice 
Department deliberations” related to, among other things, the risk to the 
underlying classified information, which the FBI refused to make available for 
prosecution purposes.117  
Accordingly, we conclude that the non-use of the ATRC is due to 
procedural hurdles erected by the original legislation.118 In particular, the dual 
findings required for the ATRC to authorize the use of classified evidence 
without an unclassified summary of such evidence impose an unworkably high 
burden on the government, preventing use of the ATRC for exactly the type of 
cases that it was intended to hear.119 Additionally, the unique and imprecise 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 98 (noting numerous reasons why cases were 
not pursued, including “procedural complexities that soon overwhelmed these terrorist 
cases”). 
 115 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (concluding that the 
government’s detention of a U.S. citizen and unlawful enemy combatant violated the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (detention of 
criminal alien did not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); cf. Scott Shane, 
The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/QG4R 
-PKUA] (discussing the killing of a United States citizen in Yemen by drone strike). 
 116 See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 97–98 (“[B]y 1998, Justice attorneys in the 
Terrorism and Violent Crime Section had led a department review of 50 cases for possible 
application to the ATRC, but they were all rejected. Over the following two years, another 
50 cases were rejected.” (internal footnotes omitted)).  
 117 See id. at 98. The 9/11 Commission Staff’s report was based, among other things, on 
interviews in 2003 and 2004 with former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner and Dan 
Cadman and Laura Baxter, who worked for INS’s National Security Unit, which was then 
responsible for case referrals to the ATRC. Id. at 96, 108. Notably, some potential ATRC 
cases also stalled because of internal deliberations regarding “alien rights [] and sufficiency 
of evidence.” Id. at 98. 
 118 Cf. David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy 
Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 316 (2004) (“To date the ATRC has not been 
used, probably owing to the very narrow range of circumstances that come within its 
jurisdiction—a statutory restriction that is not well understood.”); Valentine, supra note 21, 
at 1–2 (“[T]he statutory restraints on the [ATRC] make it effectively useless.”).  
 119 147 CONG. REC. S11,578 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“I have 
been informed that the notice requirements and other procedural obstacles that force the 
Federal Government to disclose classified information just basically renders the [ATRC] 
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standard that describes the threat posed by publicly disclosing necessary 
classified evidence severely diminishes the utility of the ATRC statutes as a 
prosecutorial tool.120 These barriers should be acknowledged and legislatively 
corrected to render the ATRC a viable forum for appropriate cases, as originally 
intended.121 
A. The Dual Findings Necessary to Utilize Classified Information 
Where No Adequate Summary Is Possible Should Instead Be Alternative 
Options 
The ATRC was created so that the federal government could introduce 
classified evidence in support of its effort to remove noncitizens engaged in 
terrorist activity while preserving the classified nature of that evidence and its 
sources.122 As discussed above, the government can only introduce classified 
evidence in the ATRC removal proceeding in two circumstances.123 First, 
classified evidence can be admitted where the ATRC deems the government’s 
proposed unclassified summary to be “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a 
defense.”124 Second, even where the court finds the proposed summary 
inadequate, it can nonetheless admit the classified information into evidence if 
                                                                                                                     
useless.”); 147 CONG. REC. S11,579 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) 
(noting that, based on discussions with the U.S. Attorney General, “[T]he Justice Department 
has used the court, as I said before, not once—not even one time—to deport any alien 
terrorist or suspected alien terrorist. Again, the reason is because they have to compromise 
their sources and methods to do it. . . . The intelligence community gets this, and they cannot 
act on it because to act on it would compromise their own people and their methods of 
collection. To not act on it means they stay here. So that is where we are. That is why not 
one case has been brought to court since my legislation created it in 1996.”). But see 147 
CONG. REC. S11,582 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (indicating that, 
based on his discussion with the Department of Justice, the ATRC’s non-use “is not because 
an unclassified summary has to be provided to the defendant” and that he did not understand 
the Department of Justice to be seeking a blanket exception to providing an unclassified 
summary). 
 120 See 147 CONG. REC. S11,580 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (citing to a reprinting of 
Edward T. Pound & Chitra Ragavan, Finger-Pointing, Fingerprints: The Hunt for Evidence 
and, Hard on Its Heels, Charges About Who Screwed Up, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 1, 2001) (“Former 
Justice Department officials say the agency couldn’t use the [ATRC] because the law 
requires disclosure of sensitive information to terrorists—evidence, they say, that would 
compromise intelligence gathering and identify sources.”)). 
 121 As a threshold point and notwithstanding questions of judicial deference doctrine 
applicability or the congressional Article III court creation authority, the Department of 
Justice lacks the authority to regulate to remedy some of these and other issues because the 
ATRC statutes—as they relate to judicial administration and standards—are not organic to 
the Department. See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674–75 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
 122 See supra Part III.  
 123 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3) (2012). This is specific to the removal hearing itself, as 
opposed to the application for the initiation of such a proceeding. See id. § 1533(a). 
 124 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C). 
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it makes certain findings.125 It is those findings that pose one of the biggest 
barriers to the use of the ATRC. 
By statute, the ATRC can only admit classified information into evidence 
without the provision of an unclassified summary if it determines that: 
(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause 
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily 
injury to any person, and (II) the provision of the summary would likely cause 
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily 
injury to any person.126  
Because the statute uses the conjunctive “and,” the ATRC must find that 
both (I) and (II) are satisfied. 
It would be imprudent for the government to begin the ATRC process in 
precedent-setting circumstances when it is not reasonably confident that it will 
be able to rely on the very classified evidence that warrants the use of such venue 
from the start.127 It would be rare that the government can rest assured that its 
proposed summary will be deemed adequate.128 If such a summary were 
                                                                                                                     
 125 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii). 
 126 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii)–(iii). The government is also provided one opportunity to 
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by the 
court.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(i). 
 127 Although many aspects of the ATRC process are similar to the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA), the two are analytically distinct and used for very different purposes. 
See Blum, supra note 22, at 681 n.9. CIPA, applies only to criminal cases. See CIPA, Pub. 
L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025 (1980) (“An Act [t]o provide certain pretrial, trial, and 
appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified information.” (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, No. 12-cv-1905, 2015 WL 1021118, at *5 
(D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2015) (“CIPA is reserved for criminal cases . . . .”). CIPA is intended to 
allow the government to know what classified information must be produced in discovery 
and what may come in at trial. Sum, 2015 WL 1021118, at *5. (“CIPA ‘provides criminal 
procedures that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified 
information in a secure setting.’” (citation omitted)); 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 4, 6, 8 (2009). 
Unlike the ATRC, CIPA does not allow the introduction of evidence in the case in chief to 
which the Defendant does not personally have access. Id. § 6(f); Lorr, supra note 89, at 2712 
(“[I]mmigration is the only area of the law where absolutely secret evidence is permitted as 
evidence in an adversarial setting.”); id. at 2699 (“CIPA does not allow a jury to see any 
information that the defendant himself cannot see.”). In 2001, Rep. David Bonior 
unsuccessfully proposed legislation that would have made CIPA applicable to immigration 
proceedings, including proceedings in the ATRC. See generally Secret Evidence Repeal Act 
of 2001, H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. 
 128 Niles, supra note 40, at 1857. As Niles notes, the adequate summary requirement is 
“unrealistic” in most cases that would end up at the ATRC. Id. A case will have only made 
it to that stage after the Attorney General found, and an Article III judge agreed, there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant is an alien terrorist and that conventional removal 
proceedings would pose a risk to the national security. Id. at 1857–58; 8 U.S.C. § 1533; see 
also Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 707 (1998) (arguing “[i]t is also 
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sufficiently specific, it would risk revealing to the alien or others the 
government’s classified information, sources, and, potentially, methods of 
collection.129 This results in a Catch-22, which one former high-level 
Department of Justice official has described: 
If the government prepares an unclassified summary of the evidence that is too 
vague and general, it will not be approved by the Judge. If, on the other hand, 
the evidence is too clear and specific, the classified evidence itself will be 
effectively disclosed, thus harming national security by compromising sources 
and methods of intelligence gathering.130 
Given this Catch-22 and the very real likelihood that it will be unable to 
share enough information for the ATRC to deem the summary adequate, before 
initiating a case, the Department of Justice must determine whether it can satisfy 
the standard for proceeding without an adequate unclassified summary.131 
Meeting both prongs of that standard, however, imposes an untenable burden 
on the government.132 The government must show not only that the information 
is properly classified at a very high level (Finding II),133 but also that allowing 
the alien to remain in the United States would cause “serious and irreparable 
                                                                                                                     
unclear how detailed the summary must be” as it appears to be left entirely to judicial 
discretion). 
 129 See Niles, supra note 40, at 1857; see also 147 CONG. REC. S11,577–78 (daily ed. 
Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith). Senator Smith attributed non-use of the ATRC to 
the statute’s notice provision “that render the court ineffective and useless”: “[The Federal 
Government and intelligence community] are damned if they do and damned if they don’t 
because if they provide the information, they compromise their own sources and methods. If 
they don’t provide it, we can’t deport them.” Id. 
 130 Valentine, supra note 21, at 2. From 1988 to 1993, Valentine served in the Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush Administrations as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation. See id. at 1. 
 131 Kendall, supra note 108, at 269 (noting that it has been argued that the ATRC was 
designed to allow the government to avoid having “to choose between allowing the alien’s 
continued stay in the U.S., which threatens national security, or to disclose its reasons for 
initiating the alien’s deportation, a disclosure which in itself could endanger the country”). 
 132 See Proposed Amend. 2114 to S. 1428, 147 CONG. REC. S11,630–31 (daily ed. Nov. 
8, 2001) (proposing an amendment to the ATRC statutes to allow for use of classified 
information without any requirement for an unclassified summary) (“The [ATRC] has never 
been used because the United States is required to submit for judicial approval an 
unclassified summary of the classified evidence against the alien. If too general, this 
summary will be disapproved by the Judge. If too specific, this summary will compromise 
the underlying classified information.”); 147 CONG. REC. S11,577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) 
(statement by Sen. Smith) (“The reason for [the ATRC’s non-use] is we are required under 
the law to submit to the terrorist a summary of the intelligence we gathered on him and how 
we got it. Obviously, if the terrorist gets that information, then the people who provided that 
information are going to be killed or their lives will be at risk.”).  
 133 See infra Part IV.B discussing the lack of clarity regarding the level of classification 
required. 
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harm” to the national security or grave physical harm to another person (Finding 
I).134 
Consider two illustrative hypothetical fact patterns of possible ATRC 
candidate cases that would ultimately fail due to the conjunctive finding 
requirement: 
Hypothetical Case 1. Suppose the government had FISA-obtained 
information classified at the Top Secret level—utilized only where disclosure 
of the information would result in exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security—indicating that the alien defendant was raising funds for a new 
terrorist organization that has stated its intention to attack U.S. citizens abroad, 
and has what appears to be a viable plan for doing so, but whose immediate 
capabilities are nonexistent or seriously in question.135 Such information would 
likely satisfy required Finding II because of the damage that would likely be 
caused by revealing the classified information or source, but it might not 
establish that the alien’s continued presence in the United States “would likely” 
result in serious and irreparable damage to the United States or an individual 
(required Finding I).136 
Hypothetical Case 2. Conversely, suppose the government had information 
obtained other than from a human source and classified at the Secret level—
utilized where disclosure of the information would result in serious damage to 
the national security—indicating that the alien defendant was intending to 
physically attack a senior official at a foreign country’s mission to the United 
Nations in New York City.137 Such information would likely satisfy required 
Finding I because of the danger to the individual, but arguably not required 
Finding II because the classification level of the evidence would indicate that 
disclosure of such information is not expected to rise to the level of “serious and 
irreparable” damage.138 
Both hypotheticals assume that the dispositive evidence cannot not be 
declassified and that traditional administrative removal proceedings are not 
viable, and thus, present as the type of cases that the ATRC was created to 
handle. It seems inappropriate to force the government to make a Hobson’s 
choice between (a) allowing such individuals to remain in the United States and 
dedicating substantial law enforcement resources to monitor their activity or (b) 
                                                                                                                     
 134 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) (2012). 
 135 This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) 
(IV) (2012). 
 136 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii); see also infra Part IV.B discussing the lack of clarity 
regarding the level of classification required. 
 137 This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) 
(III), given the employee’s status as an “internationally protected person.” See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1116(b)(4) (2012). 
 138 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii); see also infra Part IV.B. 
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disclosing the classified information (and perhaps burning the underlying 
methods or sources) in order to seek the terrorist-alien’s removal.139 
To render the ATRC workable, Congress should revise 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1354(e)(3)(D)(iii) so that either finding would allow the removal hearing to 
move forward without a summary. Replacing the conjunctive “and” with the 
disjunctive “or” would increase the likelihood that the Department of Justice 
will utilize the ATRC for the most serious removal cases. Such change would 
make the above hypothetical cases viable cases for ATRC consideration as a 
statutory and practical administration matter. 
Moreover, changing the statute to the disjunctive comports with the bills 
originally introduced by President Clinton and several senior Democrat 
Senators.140 Both of those bills provided that the removal hearing could proceed 
without a summary if the ATRC found: 
(A) the continued presence of the alien in the United States, or 
(B) the provision of the required summary would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to 
any person.141 
Thus, the original proposals by the Democrat Senators required the ATRC 
to make either Finding I or Finding II, not both.142 
The legislative history is unclear how the findings ended up being written 
in the conjunctive, which appears to have occurred when Republican leadership 
incorporated a more robust version of the ATRC provisions into the bill 
originally proposed by Senator Dole one week after the Oklahoma City 
bombing.143  
Regardless of whether the findings were required in the conjunctive by way 
of a drafting error or intentionally, revising them to be disjunctive alternatives 
                                                                                                                     
 139 Cf. 141 CONG. REC. S7480 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The 
success of our counter-terrorism efforts depends on the effective use of classified information 
used to infiltrate foreign terrorist groups. We cannot afford to turn over these secrets in open 
court, jeopardizing both the future success of these programs and the lives of those who carry 
them out.”). 
 140 See S. 390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (1995) (introduced on behalf of President 
Clinton) (using disjunctive “or”); 141 CONG. REC. S2508 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (section-
by-section analysis) (using disjunctive “or”); Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, 
S. 761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (introduced by five Democrat Senators) (using disjunctive 
“or”); 141 CONG. REC. S6206 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (section-by-section analysis) (using 
disjunctive “or”). The Reagan Administration-sponsored bill that originally sought to create 
a special alien terrorist court likewise allowed for proof in the disjunctive. See 137 CONG. 
REC. S1187 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (including language that read “if necessary to prevent 
serious harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person, a 
statement informing the alien that no such summary is possible” (emphasis added)). 
 141 See S. 390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (emphasis added); S. 761, 104th Cong. 
§ 502(e)(2) (emphasis added). 
 142 See S. 390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2); S. 761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2). 
 143 See supra Part II.A discussing the legislative history of the ATRC. 
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would be a serious step toward addressing “the Catch-22 situation that has 
crippled the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.”144 
B. The Classification Level for Evidence Deemed Sufficient to Proceed 
Without a Summary Is Unclear and Should Be Revised 
As shown above, in most if not all cases, the ATRC will be required to 
determine whether the government has made the showing required to proceed 
without an unclassified summary.145 In addition to imposing too heavy of a 
burden on the government, the current statutory scheme uses language that has 
no clear legal analogue to describe the risk to the national security posed by the 
release of specific evidence.146  
Specifically, § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) uses the phrase “serious and irreparable 
harm to the national security,” a novel phrase in the United States Code that 
does not appear in any court decision.147 Utilization of such an untethered 
standard creates a framework that lacks clarity for both the Department of 
Justice and the ATRC, and further impairs the viability of the court. To remedy 
this situation and render the ATRC a viable venue, Congress should revise the 
statute to utilize its preferred classification level. 
“Since World War I, the Executive Branch has engaged in efforts to protect 
national security information by means of a classification system graded 
according to sensitivity.”148 In 1951, President Harry S. Truman extended the 
classification system from the military to civilian departments and agencies of 
the federal government, and created the familiar classification levels of “top 
secret,” “secret,” and “confidential.”149 And since at least 1978, the United 
States has used the same standards for classifying evidence at each of those 
levels.150 Given the durability and consistency of their use, the standards are 
                                                                                                                     
 144 Valentine, supra note 21, at 3. 
 145 See supra Part IV.A. 
 146 See supra Part II.A. 
 147 The only other context in which we have located this phrase is in U.S. Department 
of Justice Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee’s testimony to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 regarding the committee’s release 
of classified information. U.S. Intelligence Agencies & Activities: Intelligence Costs and 
Fiscal Procedures: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 679 
(1975) (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. Rex E. Lee, Civil Division, Department of Justice) 
(“In addition, the release of classified information such as the Committee has done, and has 
stated it will continue to do, causes serious and irreparable harm to the national security and 
foreign relations of the United States.”). This statement did not require judicial application 
of the standard. 
 148 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (citing The National Security 
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1193–94 (1972)). 
 149 See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9797 (Sept. 27, 1951); The National 
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, supra note 148, at 1198–264. 
 150 See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (June 28, 1978); Exec. 
Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,874–75 (Apr. 2, 1982); Exec. Order No. 12,958, 
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now well-established in both executive branch operations and in case law.151 
This familiarity renders workable executive determinations on classification, 
and judicial review of such determinations. 
In direct contrast to the well-established standards for classification levels, 
the ATRC statutes utilize the phrase “serious and irreparable harm to the 
national security.”152 This combination of words has only been used in the 
ATRC statute.153 Though standing alone, the “serious and irreparable harm” 
standard aligns with the equitable standard for issuing a preliminary 
injunction,154 its application to the more nebulous concept of “national security” 
is less clear than its application to a specific organization or individual.155 
Moreover, the language used to describe the harm to the national security is 
also in direct contrast to the utilization of a well-established standard with regard 
to the harm that would be caused to an individual. The ATRC statutes allow for 
the use of classified evidence without a summary if the court determines that 
both the “continued presence of the alien in the United States” and “the 
provision of [an adequate] summary would likely cause . . . death or serious 
bodily injury to any person.”156 The “death or serious bodily injury” standard is 
relatively simple to apply. “Death,” of course, is self-explanatory. And “serious 
bodily injury” is a term that is defined elsewhere in federal statutes,157 and in 
                                                                                                                     
60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 18,826 (Apr. 17, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 
707–08 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
 151 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fields, What Is Classified Information, and Who Gets to Decide?, 
CONVERSATION (May 16, 2017), http://theconversation.com/what-is-classified-information-
and-who-gets-to-decide-77832 [https://perma.cc/3KXA-8QCG] (discussing the origin of 
these standards and how they are implemented in practice). 
 152 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) (2012). 
 153 The closest phrasing the authors located in a statutory or Article III context was a 
line in a brief filed on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy. See Brief of Federal Defendants-
Appellants at 10, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 
07-56157), 2007 WL 3069208 (“The district court then dismissed in a single sentence the 
evidence showing that a preliminary injunction would cause serious and irreparable harm to 
the Navy and national security.”). 
 154 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking 
a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). 
 155 “National security” is statutorily defined within the ATRC statutes to broadly mean 
“the national defense and foreign relations of the United States,” a definition incorporated 
from the Classified Information Protection Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) (incorporating 18 
U.S.C. App. 3 § 1 (2009)); cf. AMOS A. JORDAN ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 4 
(6th ed. 2009) (noting the multiple principles covered by the term “national security” and 
stating that “[p]reserving the national security of the United States requires safeguarding 
individual freedoms and other U.S. values, as well as the laws and institutions established to 
protect them”). 
 156 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) (emphasis added). 
 157 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘serious bodily injury’ means 
bodily injury which involves—(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) 
protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function 
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the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.158 It is a familiar, discernible standard that can 
be applied to determine whether the government has adduced sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the ATRC standards with regard to the risk posed to an 
individual. 
Legislative revision would bring similar predictability and uniformity to the 
ATRC’s standard for the type of harm posed to the national security. In light of 
the well-established classification level standards and the nature of the court, 
Congress would be well served to utilize the language that has become so 
ingrained in the national security framework. The application of these standards 
would permit the Department of Justice sufficient predictability in assessing 
whether the classified information in support of removing the potential 
defendant is of the type intended by Congress to justify proceeding without an 
unclassified summary.159  
As noted above, the ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable 
harm to the national security.”160 That standard appears to exist somewhere 
between the standards for classifying evidence as “Secret” (“serious damage”) 
and “Top Secret” (“exceptionally grave damage”).161 In light of Congress’s 
original drafting choice, we suggest that the classification standard for Secret be 
used. This would facilitate the United States’ non-disclosure of information that 
would pose serious damage to the national security to the public and to a 
defendant for whom the Attorney General and an Article III judge on the ATRC 
have already found probable cause to believe is an alien terrorist.162 This is a 
functional solution, particularly in light of the fact that the alien defendant may 
be entitled to government-financed, cleared counsel who will be able to review 
the classified evidence against the defendant,163 and to automatic expedited 
appeal under a de novo standard of review.164 
                                                                                                                     
of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”); 21 U.S.C. § 802(25) (2012) (“The term 
‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which involves—(A) a substantial risk of death; 
(B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (C) protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”). Notably, the definition of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 is expressly incorporated elsewhere into at least one other section of Title 8. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 158 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 159 The United States always retains the ability to declassify evidence, where 
appropriate, if it decides that removal is important and the evidence does not rise to the level 
for proceeding without an unclassified summary. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A). 
 160 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
 161 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 707–08 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
 162 See 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(i), (c)(2)(A).  
 163 Id. § 1534(c)(1), (e)(3)(F). 
 164 Id. § 1535(c)(2), (c)(4)(D). 
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C. Other Revisions to Better Enumerate Congress’s Intent 
While making the foregoing critical changes to the ATRC statutes, 
Congress should also utilize the opportunity to clarify its original intent with 
certain clarifications. 
1. Clarifying that Classified Evidence Is Appropriate for Consideration 
on the Merits 
The ATRC statutes should be modified to make clear that classified 
evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review is properly 
part of the basis for the court’s removal decision.165 The ability to introduce 
classified evidence in support of removal is the ATRC’s raison d’être.166 As 
currently drafted, however, the court’s reliance upon such information seems 
intended but is unclear; providing only that “[t]he decision of the judge 
regarding removal shall be based only on that evidence introduced at the 
removal hearing.”167 Notably that “removal hearing” is “open to public.”168 But 
Congress provided elsewhere that the ATRC’s written “decision as to whether 
the alien shall be removed” should only be made publicly available after 
appropriate redactions have been made.169 Thus, Congress contemplated that 
                                                                                                                     
 165 See id. § 1534(c)(5).  
 166 See Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 47 (2001), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=2388 [https://perma.cc/U3J7-8SDY] (statement of 
Jeanne A. Butterfield, Executive Director, American Immigration Lawyers Association) 
(“[T]he new Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures . . . were designed to allow the government 
to conduct deportation hearings with the use of secret evidence.”); ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra 
note 30, at 97 (“[T]he Alien Terrorist Removal Court . . . [was] expressly designed to remove 
alien terrorists by using classified evidence to support a terrorist allegation and by staffed by 
[sic] counsel possessing the security clearances necessary to review classified evidence.”); 
Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 45 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL. 55, 55 (1997), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/01/11/usab4505.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/8XJE-AGQJ] (“[The] ATRC is designed to allow the United States to deport alien 
terrorists on the basis of classified information without having to disclose that information 
to the alien or the public.”); Martin, supra note 118, at 316 (“Only since 1996 has the 
government been authorized to use confidential information as part of the case in chief 
supporting removability of an admitted alien, and only in the context of unique proceedings 
before a special tribunal known as the Alien Terrorist Removal Court . . . .”).  
 167 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5). This is in contrast to the provision allowing the ATRC to base 
its initial probable cause determination on such evidence. Id. § 1533(c)(1) (“In determining 
whether to grant an application under this section, a single judge of the removal court may 
consider, ex parte and in camera, in addition to the information contained in the application—
(A) other information, including classified information . . . .”). 
 168 Id. § 1534(a)(2).  
 169 Id. § 1534(j) (“Any portion of the order that would reveal the substance or source of 
information received in camera and ex parte pursuant to subsection (e) of this section shall 
not be made available to the alien or the public.”). 
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the court would receive classified evidence in support of removal in camera and 
ex parte, and be able to rely on such information in making its removal 
determination.170 We propose the inclusion of similar language to clarify that 
consideration of such information is proper. Congress should include the phrase 
“and all classified evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte 
review” at the end of the subparagraph delineating the evidence that can be 
relied upon in making the removal decision.171 
2. Clarifying that the ATRC Should Be Evaluating the Risk Posted by 
Disclosure of an “Adequate Summary,” Which Would Include 
Disclosure of Classified Information 
The reference to “summary” in the subsection establishing the standard for 
when the government can proceed without the provision of an unclassified 
summary should be clarified.172 It refers to “the summary,” which is unclear 
because the subsection applies only in the context where the government has 
proposed an unclassified summary (i.e., one which would not pose such a 
risk)173 which the ATRC has determined to be inadequate.174 The language 
should be revised to say “an adequate summary” to capture Congress’s intent 
that the ATRC evaluate the risk posed to the national security by producing a 
summary that would be adequate (i.e., one that would likely contain classified 
information). 
3. Correcting Clerical Errors in Statutory Language and Cross 
References 
Any legislation to address the issues discussed in this Article should also 
include provisions to correct several clerical errors. The cross-reference in 
§ 1535(c)(4)(D) providing for de novo review of factual findings where a 
defendant was not provided with a summary of the classified evidence should 
be corrected so that it refers to the provision of § 1534 that actually addresses 
that possibility.175 Likewise, § 1534 should be revised to use the singular 
                                                                                                                     
 170 See id. 
 171 Id. § 1534(c)(5).  
 172 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) (“The findings described in this clause are, with respect 
to an alien, that . . . (II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.”). 
 173 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (“With respect to such information, the Government shall 
submit to the removal court an unclassified summary of the specific evidence that does not 
pose that risk.”). 
 174 See generally id. § 1534(e)(3)(D). 
 175 See id. § 1535(c)(4)(D). Compare id. § 1534(c) (addressing a defendant’s “[r]ights 
in hearing”), with id. § 1534(e)(3) (addressing “[t]reatment of classified information” and 
situations in which the case can proceed without summary). 
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“proceeding” rather than the plural form, and to maintain uniformity in how it 
refers to forms of ancillary relief that are unavailable in ATRC proceedings.176 
D. This Legislative Proposal for Changes to the ATRC Is Likely 
Constitutional 
The only actual determinant of constitutionality of the ATRC would be 
judicial review—which would likely culminate with Supreme Court review—
of an as-applied challenge to ATRC proceedings. Much of the literature that 
examines the ATRC concludes that the court may be susceptible to Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause vulnerability.177 Unsurprisingly, it is difficult 
to guarantee whether a novel specialty court that literally considers “secret” (or 
“top secret”) evidence ex parte is constitutional.178 However, there are strong 
arguments in favor of the ATRC’s ability to withstand Fifth Amendment due 
process scrutiny that are not adversely affected by our proposal, especially as it 
applies to LPRs, the principal class of noncitizen terrorists for which we think 
the ATRC is still required following the passage of IIRIRA and the PATRIOT 
Act.179 As described below, the ATRC statutes provide LPRs with important 
procedural protections that are superior to protections in conventional 
administrative removal proceedings. Accounting for the possibility of a court 
identifying heightened due process rights for an LPR in ATRC proceedings,180 
a due process analysis that contemplates an LPR defendant where an 
unclassified summary is not provided is not only the most likely scenario for the 
                                                                                                                     
 176 See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (using plural “proceedings” where sentence structure calls 
for singular “proceeding”); see also id. § 1534(k) (including adverb “by” in a context where 
it makes no logical sense and is inconsistent with other disjunctive subsections).  
 177 See, e.g., DYCUS ET AL., supra note 113, at 856 (“It may be that constitutional doubts 
about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special court are why the government 
has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 22, at 703 (“Many scholars have argued that the ATRC 
deprives aliens of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment; hence, its non-use 
may reflect a fear that if it was used to remove aliens based on classified evidence, it may be 
struck down as unconstitutional.”); id. at 704–10 (reviewing arguments made against the 
constitutionality of ATRC); Niles, supra note 40, at 1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the 
ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has never used the court.”); cf. Zachery, supra 
note 26, at 294 (“The [ATRC] is an amalgamation of statutes which are independently 
constitutional . . . select[ing] constitutionally valid provisions from each statute. The result 
is legislation that is within the letter of the law but is arguably not within the spirit of our 
democracy . . . .”). 
 178 We do not examine the constitutionality of the detention provisions in the ATRC 
statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1534(i), 1536(a)(2)(A), due to the high variability of their potential use 
and the fact that there is ample detention authority contained elsewhere in the INA under 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231 (2012). 
 179 See supra Part III.  
 180 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (contemplating possible 
variable due process protection for “an alien subject to a final order of deportation” 
depending on “status and circumstance”). 
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court’s use, but also the scenario that triggers the most procedural protections 
available to the defendant. 
Congress carefully considered the constitutionality and the due process 
implications of the ATRC statutes at the time of AEDPA’s enactment.181 
Congress intentionally engaged in due process balancing, designing what it 
believed would be “an effective means of removing alien terrorists from our 
shores, while at the same time protecting due-process concerns.”182 Moreover, 
the statutorily compliant utilization of the ATRC by senior Department of 
Justice leadership would squarely implicate plenary powers doctrinal 
considerations that could weigh in the Executive Branch’s favor on judicial 
review.183 
Due process protections are a central feature to the counter-majoritarian 
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, and the adjudication of a due process 
claim is an individualized determination.184 The Supreme Court has 
traditionally relied on the three-part balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge to 
adjudicate Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims.185 In a prospective 
                                                                                                                     
 181 142 CONG. REC. S3353 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 
141 CONG. REC. S6206 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (section-by-section analysis) (“[The ATRC 
provisions are] a carefully measured response to the menace posed by alien terrorists and 
fully comports with and exceeds all constitutional requirements applicable to aliens.”); 141 
CONG. REC. S7487 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (criticizing the ATRC 
proposals as creating a “kind of Star Chamber proceeding” predicated on the use of classified 
evidence); Yu, supra note 25, at 1 (“Congress structured the ATRC to balance national 
security needs with fundamental notions of due process.”). 
 182 142 CONG. REC. S3354 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996). 
 183 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien 
denied entry is concerned.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602–03 (1889) 
(deferring to Congress or the agencies on the question of national security and immigration). 
But see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that such deference is subject to the 
Constitution in a case that involved a claim of unconstitutional prolonged immigration 
detention—the judiciary “must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking” 
on immigration questions, but the congressional “plenary power” on setting immigration 
policy is “subject to important constitutional limitations”); see also Michael Kagan, Plenary 
Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 23 
(2015) (describing one scholar’s observation that the Supreme Court has deferred to 
Congress on procedural due process questions less over time). 
 184 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 185 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal footnotes omitted) 
(observing that the Mathews test applies to property and liberty interests): 
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing 
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action” against the 
Government’s asserted interest, “including the function involved” and the burdens the 
Government would face in providing greater process. The Mathews calculus then 
contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of “the risk 
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as-applied challenge to the revised ATRC—one that is based on legislative 
revision and aligns with the recommendations of this Article—a court would 
first need to consider the varying private interest particulars of the case 
including any limitations on access to classified evidentiary materials, the nature 
of the unclassified summary to the extent one is provided, the fullness of notice 
related to the allegations of fact, the judgment of the ATRC on questions of both 
fact and law, and potentially other considerations.  
The court then would likely weigh the foregoing against the government’s 
national security and INA enforcement interests against alleged noncitizen 
terrorists, along with the panoply of pro-defendant and pro-transparency 
procedures, especially in comparison with administrative removal proceedings, 
to determine “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s protected 
interest(s) and the “probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.”186 In some respects, the pro-defendant procedures of the ATRC 
exceed those that were afforded by the Supreme Court in its maximalist opinion 
regarding a welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly187 and in comparison with 
procedures that exist in conventional administrative removal proceedings.  
In particular and unlike administrative removal proceedings, there is direct 
political accountability for the initiation of ATRC cases, vested in the Attorney 
General or the Deputy Attorney General.188 There is also Article III 
accountability for such case initiation with a weighty probable cause 
standard.189 Unlike administrative removal proceedings that reserve Article III 
review until the completion of a two-stage administrative adjudicatory process, 
there is Article III administration of all stages of an ATRC case from initiation 
through final judgment and appeal.190 Unlike administrative removal 
proceedings, there is a statutory requirement for speedy proceedings in ATRC 
                                                                                                                     
of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if the process were reduced and the 
“probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” 
 186 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 187 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–71 (1970). Notably, limitation of access to 
classified information can implicate the particularized notice, cross-examination capability, 
and breadth of the written decision following the adjudication procedures that the welfare 
recipient in Goldberg was entitled. Id. 
 188 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012) (administrative removal proceedings are 
initiated by the lodging of a “notice to appear,” which flows from delegable authority), with 
id. § 1533(a)(1) (requiring non-delegable authorization). 
 189 Id. § 1533(c)(2). The government may supplement its application with “information, 
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a 
hearing on the application. Id. § 1533(c)(1). 
 190 Compare id. § 1252(a)(5)−(b) (describing a petition for review process for 
administratively final orders of removal), with id. §§ 1531–37 (contemplating the Article III 
function at all stages of adjudication).  
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cases,191 and the ATRC statutes enumerate a right to government-financed 
counsel.192 
Moreover, LPRs who were not provided a written summary of classified 
information earlier in proceedings are entitled to government-funded, cleared 
“special” counsel to access and challenge the veracity of classified 
information,193 as well as appellate de novo review of ATRC factual findings.194 
Such defendants are also entitled to a “release hearing” before an ATRC judge 
upon the Department of Justice’s filing of a case-initiating application to the 
court.195 On appeal, there are number of unique defendant-centric advantages in 
ATRC proceedings that weigh favorably for the government in a Mathews 
inquiry.196 There is an automatic stay of a removal order during the pendency 
of appeal.197 There is automatic appeal of certain decisions,198 and there is a 
requirement for expedited appeal.199  
Given the numerous procedures that Congress mandated to make the ATRC 
less Star Chamber-like, a visual reference is helpful to convey the superior 

















                                                                                                                     
 191 Id. § 1534(a)(1) (“[A] removal hearing shall be conducted under this section as 
expeditiously as practicable.”); Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove 
Bigger Barrier for Migrants than Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us/migrants -border-immigration-co 
urt.html [https://perma.cc/788M-VHDG] (examining the consequences of an immigration 
court backlog in excess of 800,000 cases).  
 192 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1). 
 193 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F). 
 194 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(4)(D) (2012). 
 195 Id. § 1536(a)(2)(A). 
 196 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 197 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1). 
 198 Id. § 1535(c)(2). 
 199 Id. § 1535(c)(4). 
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Accordingly, there are ample procedures that could lead Article III jurists 
to conclude that the ATRC passes due process muster under a Mathews analysis, 
but the ultimate test will come in an as-applied challenge if and when the court 
is used, and then predicated principally on how persuasively primary and 
cleared counsel argue that the withholding of certain classified evidence creates 
an unacceptably high probability of judicial error. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Though the ATRC currently presents as a zombie court, it was created for 
the discrete and important purpose of reconciling the congressional imperatives 
of protecting national security information and removing noncitizen terrorists 
while maintaining fidelity to the Constitution and providing due process. It took 
three successive presidential administrations to enact its statutory framework, 
and it has existed for nearly a quarter century without hearing a single case. The 
IIRIRA and PATRIOT Act have since provided alternative mechanisms to hold 
accountable and remove non-LPRs noncitizens. Even so, the importance of the 
ATRC remains static for the few terrorist LPRs who cannot otherwise be 
removed from the United States. To the extent Congress enacts the 
commonsense and narrow reforms to the statutes that we propose in this Article, 
it is likely the ATRC will finally be rendered functional and able to fulfill its 
important function to provide an avenue for the removal of the most serious LPR 
threats to national security. Indeed, because of the ATRC’s procedural 
impediments, such individuals may very well currently be present in the United 
States for want of prosecutorial tools to remove them without compromising 
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APPENDIX  




To amend the provision in Title 8, United States Code, related to the 
Alien Terrorist Removal Court (8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537) to clarify the 
standards for utilization of the ATRC. 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
SECTION 1. UPDATING THE ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL 
COURT 
 
(1) Title 8, United States Code, Subchapter V (8 U.S.C. 1531–1537), 
is amended: 
(a) by striking the period after “hearing” in section 1534(c)(5) 
and inserting the following language at the end: “and all 
classified evidence submitted to the court for in camera and 
ex parte review.”; 
(b) by striking “proceedings” in section 1534(e)(1)(A) and 
replacing with “proceeding”; 
(c) by striking “person, and” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and 
replacing with “person, or”; 
(d) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section 
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and replacing with “serious damage”; 
(e) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section 
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) and replacing with “serious damage”; 
(f) by striking “the summary” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) 
and replacing with “an adequate summary”; and 
(g) by striking the cross-reference to “1534(c)(3)” in section 
1535(c)(4)(D) and replacing with “1534(e)(3)”. 
 
 
